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ROE v. WADE AND THE LESSON OF THE
PRE-ROE CASE LAW
Richard Gregory Morgan*t
The standard criticism of Roe v. Wade 1 is that the Supreme
Court indulged in "Lochnering": the improper second-guessing of
a legislative balance. 2 Rarely does the Supreme Court invite critical outrage as it did in Roe by offering so little explanation for a
decision that requires so much. The stark inadequacy of the
Court's attempt to justify its conclusions - that abortion implicates women's "privacy," that only the most important state interests may supersede that right, and that they may do so only
after certain stages of pregnancy- suggests to some scholars that
the Court, finding no justification at all in the Constitution, unabashedly usurped the legislative function. 3 Professor Ely, the first
to cry "Lochner," could only adduce from the opinion that the
Court "manufactured a constitutional right out of whole cloth
and used it to superimpose its own view of wise social policy on
those of the legislatures. " 4 Even some who approve Roe's form of
judicial review concede that the opinion itself is inscrutable. G
* Law Clerk, The Honorable J. Edward Lumbard, United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. A.B. 1976, University of California at Los Angeles; J.D. 1979,
University of Michigan - Ed.
t Being an avid reader of authors' acknowledgments (because it's fun to see who
knows whom), I have often read "I would never have completed this work without the
invaluable encouragement of So-and-So." But being young, energetic, and imbued with
a work ethic, I have never understood how anyone could even think of not completing a
task once begun - until, for a variety of circumstances they know, I found myself unable
to continue this paper without the daily support of Ginny Popper and Carl and Joan
Schneider. Thanks guys.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe u. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973).
3. See Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases,
1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159, 184-85:
Roe u. Wade is symptomatic of the analytical poverty possible in constitutional
litigation . . . . Thus in the end we must criticize both Mr. Justice Blackmun in
Roe u. Wade and the entire method of constitutional interpretation that allows the
Supreme Court in the name of Due Process both to "define" and to "balance"
interests on the major social and political issues of our time.
4. Ely, supra note 2, at 937.
5. See Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term - Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles
in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REv.1, 7 (1973) ("One of the most curious
things about Roe is that, behind its own verbal smokescreen, the substantive judgment
on which it rests is nowhere to be found.").
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Critics have cried "Lochner!" before, however, and that worries Professor Ely, who fears that the specter of past mistakes may
lose its awe by becoming too familiar. 6 But more was at stake in
the Supreme Court's handling of Roe than the wrath of critics:
By taking an abortion case when it did, the Court forestalled the
development of one of its ·traditional aids for deciding difficult
questions - a thoughtful lower-court case law.
Supreme Court decisions are often thought of as if they have
no history, somehow beginning and ending in the Supreme Court.
But they are products of a judicial system, one that traditionally
adheres to certain axioms that protect and enhance the quality
of Supreme Court review. One axiom posits that the Supreme
Court should hesitate to decide disputes which the political
branch is still actively debating. Beyond observing the wellestablished "political questions" doctrine, the Court respects the
representativeness of government and deepens the thoughtfulness
of its own deliberations if it stays out of a dispute until legislatures and executives make an initial decision. 7 A second axiom
cautions that even after a dispute reaches the judicial system, the
Supreme Court should still hesitate to hear a specific case until
lower courts have "aged" the dispute by articulating the best
arguments on both sides and discarding the unpersuasive or irrelevant. 8
The Supreme Court completely disregarded both those axioms in Roe. The politically unsettled and judicially confused law
of abortion in 1971 and 1972, when the Court twice heard arguments and deliberated Roe, should have warned it not to decide
the case. By doing so; the Court thrust itself into a political debate and stunted the development of a thoughtful lower-court
case law. If the Court did perceive the warnings but continued
toward a decision anyway, perhaps trusting that its own consider6. Ely, supra note 2, at 943-44.
7. Cf. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 115 (1962) ("standing" and "case and
controversy" help make sound judicial decisions by letting courts see legislation's practical consequences before they decide).
8. See Youngstown Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 937, 938 (1952) (Burton,
J., dissenting from grant of certiorari):
The constitutional issue which is the subject of the appeal deserves for its solution
all of the wisdom which our judicial system makes available. The need for soundness in the result outweighs the need for speed in reaching it. The Nation is entitled
to the substantial value inherent in an intermediate consideration of the issue by
the Court of Appeals. Little time will be lost and none will be wasted in seeking it.
The time taken will be available also for constructive consideration by the parties
of their own positions and responsibilities.

1726

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:1724

able wits would devise an answer the lower courts had not, the
result suggestB--that the judicial system's axioms deserve more
respect than they received. This Article, by showing briefly in
Section I that the Court should not have decided an abortion case
when it did, and by showing at more length in Section II that the
Court could find no persuasive rationale in the pre-Roe cases for
each of the points in its decision, argues that Roe was almost
destined to be a bad opinion.

I.
In 1973, political forces were still vigorously debating abortion. Most states had prohibited abortions, except to save a
woman's life, since the nineteenth century, 9 but a movement was
afoot to relax that restriction. In the five years immediately preceding Roe, thirteen states had revised their statutes to resemble
the Model Penal Code's provisions, 10 which allowed abortions not
only if the pregnancy threatened the woman's life, but also if it
would gravely impair her physical or mental health, if it resulted
from rape or incest, or if the child would be born with grave
physical or mental defects. 11 Four states had removed all restrictions on the permissible reasons for seeking an abortion before a
pregnancy passed specified lengths. 12 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court noted in Roe, both the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association had only recently changed
their official views on abortion (and not without opposition) . 13
The abortion debate was not merely one of how far to relax restrictions, however. At least one of the states whose restrictive
statutes were judicially invalidated had in 1972 reaffirmed its
determination to prohibit abortions unless necessary to save the
woman's life. 14 And since several of the pre-Roe constitutional
challenges were raised by defendants in state abortion prosecutions, 15 it is clear that at least those states had not allowed their
9. See the Supreme Court's survey in Roe of the history of abortion and abortion laws,
410 U.S. at 138-39.
10. See Comment, A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law on Abortion: The
Contradictions and Problems, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 177, 180.
11. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
12. See Comment, supra note 10, at 181.
13. 410 U.S. at 143, 146.
14. See Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 226 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973).
15. YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989,
affd. without opinion, 493 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1974); Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of
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abortion statutes to lapse into desuetude. 16 In short, the political
process in many states had yet to decide on abortion. But Roe's
sweeping rejection of Texas's statute voided almost every other
state's as well. 17
Especially given the absence of a firm constitutional footing
for deciding the question, the Court could sensibly have refrained
from stepping into the debate when it did. Of course, the Court
might never decide anything if it always waited for the last political word, and had Roe been a soundly reasoned opinion, the Court
would surely never have been criticized for being a bit hasty.
Indeed, because several states had liberalized their abortion statutes, some might argue that the Court should nudge the rest of
the nation toward recognizing the right those states had found.
But the second traditional axiom should still have warned the
Court not to decide Roe: the dispute had not sufficiently steeped
in the lower courts. Allegations that abortion statutes violated a
constitutiqnal right of privacy were new to the ·courts. As late as
mid-1968, the New Jersey Supreme Court flatly rejected two defendants' claim that the state statute's exception for abortions
with "lawful justification" included abortions to end unwanted
pregnancies: "It is beyond comprehension that the defendants
could have believed that our abortion statute envisioned lawful
justification to exist whenever a woman wanted to avoid having
a child. The statutes of no jurisdiction in this country permit such
an excuse for an abortion. " 18 The court's construction of "lawful
justification" was undoubtedly correct; the significant point is
that the court gave no hint of even considering that a right of
privacy might justify such an excuse. The landmark case of
People v. Belous, 19 apparently the first case to.consider a rightMedical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S.
902 (1973); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per
curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969),
revd., 402 U.S. 62 (1971); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr.
354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); State v. Barquet, Fla., 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla.
1972); People v. Nixon, 42 Mich. App. 332, 201 N.W.2d 635 (1972), remanded, 389 Mich.
809, revd., 50 Mich. App. 38, 212 N.W.2d 797 (1973) (per curiam).
16. See generally A. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 148. Indeed, even after Babbitz v.
McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970),
declared Wisconsin's restrictive abortion statute unconstitutional, _the state attorney general continued to threaten prosecution. Babbitz v. McCann, 320 F. Supp. 219, 221 (E.D.
Wis. 1970), vacated, 402 U.S. 903 (1971).
17. See 410 U.S. at 118; Ely, supra note 2, at 920.
18. State v. Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, 194, 244 A.2d 499, 505-06, cert. denied, 393 U.S.
952 (1968).
'
19. 71 Cal. 2d 954,458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915
(1970).
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of-privacy challenge to an abortion statute and certainly the first
reported case to endorse one, 20 was decided only in September
1969, less than two years before the Supreme Court decided to
hear Roe. 21 Between 1970 and 1972, a flurry of constitutional
challenges hit the courts, but of the seventeen courts that decided
right-of-privacy claims, twelve were three-judge district courts
whose judgments allowed direct appeal to the Supreme Court. 22
Thus, when the Court had Roe before it and looked, as the
axiom has it, to the lower-court deliberations, 23 it found not one
federal decision that had received intermediate appellate consideration, and only four decisions of state supreme courts, 24 none
of which offered particularly illuminating analysis.
In general, three years is hardly time enough for the judicial
system to evolve sound analysis for most constitutional issues,
and for so emotionally charged an issue as abortion, 25 three years
20. See Comment, supra note 10, at 184.
21. The Supreme Court decid!ld on May 3, 1971 to hear arguments on jurisdiction
and the merits. 402 U.S. 941 (1971).
22. Decisions by three-judge district courts: Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D.
Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973); Crossen v. Attorney Gen., 344
F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Ky. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 960 (1973); YWCA v.
Kugler, 342 F. Supp.1048 (D.N.J. 1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989, affd. without opinion,
493 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1974); Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated
and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp, 986 (D. Kan. 1972);
Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S.
950 (1973); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971), vacated and remanded, 410
U.S. 950 (1973); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Doe v. Bolton,
319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), modified and affd., 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Rosen v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated
and remanded, 412 U.S. 902 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970),
affd. in part and revd. in part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp, 293
(E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970). Decision by one-judge district court: United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), revd. 402 U.S. 62
(1971). Decisions by state supreme courts: People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194,
80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); Cheaney v. State, 259 Ind. 138,
285 N.E.2d 265 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973); Rogers v. Danforth, 486 S.W.2d
258 (Mo. 1972) (en bane); State v. Munson, 86 S.D. 663, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972), vacated
and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973).
23. Of course one way in which the Supreme Court "looks" at lower-court decisions
is through the parties' and amici briefs. The briefs submitted to the Court for Roe are
generally susceptible to all the criticisms levelled at the lower courts, leaving the Supreme
Court, like T.S. Eliot's self-possessed gallant, "really in the dark."
24. See note 22 supra.
25. The emotions surrounding abortion were not lost on the courts. Although the
Supreme Court professed "to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of
emotion and of predilection," 410 U.S. at 116, not all the lower-court judges could have
said the same. See, e.g., Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp,
1217, 1229 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S. 902 (1973) ("This problem
involves the condition of pregnancy and its likely consequence, the first entrance of a new
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was very little time indeed. The Court could justifiably have let
the dispute simmer longer in the lower courts. And technically,
the Court could have done so. In Roe, both parties appealed the
lower-court decision to the Supreme Court: Jane Roe from the
denial of an injunction against enforcement of the statute, and
District Attorney Wade from the grant of a declaratory judgment
that the statute was unconstitutional. 26 But as the Court acknowledged, its own cases "are to the effect that§ 1253 does not
authorize an appeal to this Court from the grant or denial of
declaratory relief alone." 27 Thus, only Roe's complaint from the
denial of an injunction was properly before the Court on appeal.
Nonetheless, the Court held that "those decisions do not foreclose
our review of both the injunctive and declaratory aspects of a case
of this kind when it is properly here, as this one is, on appeal
under § 1253 from specific denial of injunctive relief, and the
arguments as to both aspects are necessarily identical." 28 Even if
the arguments as to both aspects were strictly speaking identical
(which they probably were only if the Court wished them to be),
the Court still did not have to decide the constitutional question.
It could have stayed the direct appeal on the injunction until the
appeal on the declaratory judgment had progressed to the Court
through the court of appeals, as technically that appeal should
have done. 29 The reason for doing so would have been clear: a
decision on the injunction should logically await a decision on
constitutionality (the declaratory judgment issue) and a decision
on constitutionality should await a fuller consideration by the
courts of appeals. Instead, worried that "[i]t would be destructive of time and energy for all concerned were we to rule otherplayer, 'mewling and puking,' onto the world stage. Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act ii,
sc. 7, 1, 139."); Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194,286 N.E.2d
887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972) (dissent of Burke, J., who condemned New York's liberal
abortion statute by dismissing women's "self-created problem" of injuries from illegal
abortions, 31 N.Y.2d at 207, 286 N.E.2d at 893, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 398, by decrying "the
massacre of the innocents," 31 N.Y.2d at 209-10, 286 N.E.2d at 894, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 400,
and by lamenting, "The deeper disease in this legislation is the widening gap between
the American self-image of a country that values human life and the reality of a growing
preoccupation of the hedonists with a competitive drive for La Dolce Vita." 31 N.Y.2d at
211, 286 N.E.2d at 895, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 402 (emphasis original)), appeal dismissed, 410
U.S. 949 (1973).
26. 410 U.S. at 122.
27. 410 U.S. at 123.
28. 410 U.S. at 123.
29. Interestingly, the Court dismissed for want of jurisdiction the defendant's appeal
from the grant of a declaratory judgment in Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 187 (1973).
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wise, " 30 the Court reached out to grab the abortion question and
thereby impaired its ability to construct a sound opinion, something much more valuable than time and energy. 31
II.

Even though abortion was a new issue to the courts, and even
though no federal court of appeals had considered it, the Supreme
Court might still have been justified in hearing Roe, for it had
been decided by a three-judge district court, and theory has it
that "[t]here is little to be gained by delaying important litigation of that sort that initially commands an extraordinary district
court of three judges - at least one of them a circuit judge - for
review by three other judges on a court of appeals. " 32 In this
instance, however, that theory proved false, and had done so even
before the Supreme Court heard rearguments of Roe. 33 The district court oases failed to develop any adequate analysis for deciding the constitutionality of abortion statutes; indeed, most
of them never honestly acknowledged the competing interests
involved. There is some indication that a sounder case law might
have evolved if given time. 34 But that was prevented by Roe,
where the Supreme Court, without offering any sound reason of
. its own, took each step of its decision in the face of the inability
of the lower courts that considered those steps to reach a reasoned
conclusion. In 1973 the Court could not find a rationale, but
decided anyway. That smacks distinctly of a legislative process.

A. "This right of privacy . . . is broad enough . . . . "
As do most discussions of the right of privacy, the Supreme
Court's began by conceding that "[t]he Constitution does not
explicitly mention any [such] right. " 35 A long line of cases, however, has recognized in several amendments "a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy," and "makels] it clear that the
right has some extension to activities relating to" marriage, procreation, contraception, family relations, child rearing, and edu30. 410 U.S. at 123.
31. See note 8 supra.
32. 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION § 4040, at 78 (1969).
33. The last of the important pre-Roe cases, Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D.
Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973), was announced on September
20, 1972. The Supreme Court heard reargument on October 11, 1972.
34. See text at notes 86-88 and 113-29 infra.
35. 410 U.S. at 152.
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cation. 36 A less informative phrase than "has some extension to"
is hard to imagine, but the Court gives no more information than
that before declaring, "This right of privacy . . . is broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. " 37 The Court then lists several detriments that might
befall women if they were altogether denied the choice of abortion. 38 The opinion leaves ambiguous whether the Court meant
this list somehow to prove that abortion fits within "privacy," or
only to suggest the variety of considerations that will surround
the exercise of that right, 39 but it does make clear that these
potential detriments do not imply any "unlimited right to do with
one's body as one pleases." 40
The inadequacy of that explanation is ob~ious. It does not
explain why the right of privacy, just because it extends to some
matters of sex and family, extends to abortion; nor what kind of
"privacy" abortion involves (especially given that the Court later
distinguished this "privacy" from that involved in all the other
activities to which the right extends41 ); nor why the list of detriments brings abortion within the right, if that is what the list
means to do; nor why the right apparently extends to women who
incur none of these detriments (especially if it is the detriments
that warrant extending the right). 42 But like the right of privacy
itself, Roe's inadequacy inheres in a long line of cases. The preRoe, lower-court decisions that struck down abortion statutes for
impairing the right of privacy wholly neglected legal analysis. In
virtually all the cases, the proponents of abortion argued the
same simplistic theory - that abortion involves both family and
36. 410 U.S. at 152-53.
37. 410 U.S. at 153.
38. 410 U.S. at 153.
39. Professor Ely guesses that the Court's "conclusion is thought to derive from the
passage that immediately follows it." Ely, supra note 2, at 932. Professor Tribe seems to
agree that avoiding these detriments is the gravamen of this right of privacy. Tribe, supra
note 5, at 10. But neither mentions the paragraph's last sentence, which immediately
follows the catalog of detriments: "All these are .factors the woman and her responsible
physician necessarily will consider in consultation." 410 U.S. at 153. That sentence suggests that the Court simply meant by the catalog to guide the considerations of the
physicians in whom it places so much trust ("The abortion decision in all its aspects is
inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with
the physician." 410 U.S. at 166), not that the catalog somehow proves that abortion
implicates privacy. As Professor Ely said, "Confusing signals are emitted ...•" Ely,
supra note 2, at 922.
40. 410 U.S. at 154.
41. 410 U.S. at 159.
42. See Ely, supra note 2, at 923 n.26.
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sex, and that Griswold v. Connecticut 43 and Eisenstadt v. Baird 44
place a zone of privacy around such matters 45 - and most of the
courts agreed without a second thought.
The first case to declare an abortion statute unconstitutional, People v. Belous, 46 exemplifies the lower courts' response
to this theory. The opinion's entire explanation for including
abortion within the right of privacy runs:
The fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to
bear children follows from the Supreme Court's and this court's
repeated acknowledgment of a "right to privacy" or "liberty" in
matters related to marriage, family, and sex . . . . That such a
right is not enumerated in either the United States or California
Constitutions is no impediment to the existence of the right. 47

No "impediment," perhaps, but the absence of any explicit right
or privacy within the Constitution should have suggested to the
court that it do more to support its holding than simply assert
that the right exists and that a right of abortion follows from it. 4K
That arguments can be made to defend extending the right of
privacy to abortion is beside the point, for arguments can be
made against it too. The point is that the Belous court, like many
of the lower courts and like the Supreme Court itself in Roe, never
even acknowledged that arguments exist. Once Belous was decided, however, precedent existed - albeit of dubious value and in a follow-the-leader style a second court cited Belous to
support its decision, 49 a third court cited Belous and the second, no
and so on until the Supreme Court cited them all. 51 Yet the most
the Supreme Court could say was that those cases generally
43. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
44. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
45. See, e.g., Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 745 (N.D, Ohio
1970); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (N.D. Ga. 1970), modified and affd., 410
U.S. 179 (1973).
46. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916
(1970).
47. 71 Cal. 2d at 963, 458 P.2d at 199-200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60 (citations omitted),
48. Cf. Ely, supra note 2, at 928 n.58 (The Supreme Court's "inability to pigeonhole
confidently the right involved is not important in and of itself. It might, however, have
alerted the Court to what is an importan.t question: whether the Constitution speaks to
the matter at all." (emphasis original)).
49. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 300 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per
curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970).
50. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1222 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd. in part and revd.
in part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. 410 U.S. at 154.
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"reached the same conclusion,"52 that they "agreed that the right
of privacy, however based, is broad enough to cover the abortion
decision."53 Just how they reached that conclusion the Court necessarily left unexplained.
Those courts that did attempt an explanation, Doe v. Scott 54
for instance, usually drew the analogy between contraception and
abortion:
We do not agree with the defendants that the choice whether
to have a child is protected before conception but is not so protected immediately after conception has occurred. A woman's interest in privacy and in control over her body is just as seriously
interfered with by a law which prohibits abortions as it is by a law
which prohibits the use of contraceptives. 55

Although less cryptic than Belous, this is hardly more persuasive.
Certainly abortion statutes interfere with women's interests as
seriously as do restrictions on the use of contraceptives. But why
does a right to resist interference with the use of contraceptives
equal a right to resist interference with abortion? If because
women may control their own bodies, as Scott suggests, then the
analogy reads into Griswold a rationale that simply is not there. 56
If for some other reason, then what? The analogy to contraception
is not a complete argument for placing abortion within the right
of "privacy."57 It is, nonetheless, about the only argument the
pre-Roe courts made.
One case, Abele v. Markle, 58 did try something slightly different. The court still relied on the questionable reading that
Griswold and Eisenstadt apply to abortion, but in describing
women's interests it said:
52. 410 U.S. at 154.
53. 410 U.S. at 155.
54. 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973).
55. 321 F. Supp. at 1390 (footnote omitted).
56. See Ely, supra note 2, at 929-30, 929 n.68. The Supreme Court expressly rejected
in Roe the theory of unimpairable bodily control, 410 U.S. at 154, and characterized
Griswold as a case about "marital intimacy," 410 U.S. at 159; but even before Doe v.
Scott, at least one court had already refused (although without explanation) to read into
Griswold a theory of bodily control. Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 n.2 (N.D. Ga.
1970), modified and affd., 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
57. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 170.
58. 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973).
There are two cases entitled Abele v. Markle. The first, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972),
struck down the restrictive abortion statute Connecticut had originally passed in 1860.
The second, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972), struck down the substantially identical
statute Connecticut passed in response to the first Abele decision. See text at note 113
infra.
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The decision to carry and bear a child has extraordinary ramifications for a woman. Pregnancy entails profound physical
changes. Childbirth presents some danger to life and health. Bearing and raising a child demands difficult psychological and social
adjustments. The working or student mother frequently must curtail or end her employment or educational opportunities. The
mother with an unwanted child may find that it overtaxes her and
her family's financial or emotional resources. The unmarried
mother will suffer the stigma of having an illegitimate child. Thus,
determining whether or not to bear a child is of fundamental importance to a woman. 59

The similarity between this list and the Supreme Court's in Roe
is obvious. 80 Unfortunately, even assuming that the Court consciously adopted this particular argument (and without a wordby-word borrowing, an assumption is all that is warranted), what
the Court meant by "privacy" remains a mystery, for this argument leaves unanswered why the state may regulate any number
of decisions with equally "extraordinary ramifications. " 61
Finally, another of the pre-Roe cases, Doe v. Bolton, 62 not
only failed to offer any rationale, but tossed off its conclusion so
cavalierly that one wonders whether the court really knew what
it meant: "For whichever reason, the concept of personal liberty
embodies a right to privacy which apparently is also broad
enough to include the decision to abort a pregnancy. 2 " And in
footnote 2: "We see no connection between this theory and the
claimed right of a woman 'to use her body in any way she wishes'
read into Griswold by some." 83 That is no way for a court to
expound a Constitution.
Given this complete failure of the lower courts to argue persuasively for extending the right of privacy to abortion, it is
hardly surprising that the Supreme Court had nothing to justify
its decision. The lower courts offered it no guidance, nor did the
proponents in Roe, whose briefs argued more expansively but
relied largely on the inconclusive arguments that had proved successful thus far. 84 In short, the pre-Roe cases forged a trail that
the Supreme Court followed as if dutifully. That is surprising.
Lower courts help to prepare disputes for Supreme Court review,
but the Court obviously need not follow lower courts that cannot
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

342 F. Supp. at 801-02 (footnote omitted).
Compare 342 F. Supp. at 801-02 with 410 U.S. at 153.
See Ely, supra note 2, at 932 n.81.
319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), modified and affd., 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
319 F. Supp. at 1055 n.2.
Brief for Appellants at 91-124, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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articulate persuasive reasons for doing so. And yet the Court did
just that.

B. "Where certain 'fundamental' rights are involved .

"

In the course of its curiously dim elucidation of privacy, the
Supreme Court said, "These decisions make it clear that only
personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty' . . . are included in this guarantee
of personal privacy." 65 With just that label - "fundamental" the Court ordained the demands of its review: only "compelling
state interests" would justify abridging the right. 66 Irritated by
the Court's reliance on equal protection precedent in this due
process case, and presumably by the offhanded manner in which
the Court found so disputed a right as abortion "implicit in . . .
ordered liberty," Justice Rehnquist dissented, "Unless I misapprehend the consequences of this transplanting of the 'compelling
state interest test,' the Court's opinion will accomplish the seemingly impossible feat of leaving this area of the law more confused
than it found it." 67 But in fact, Roe left this area only as confused
as it found it. The pre-Roe cases that found the right of privacy
broad enough to include abortion had already distorted the concept of fundamental rights.
Identifying those rights that are "fundamental," in that they
are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," is a difficult task
in itself, but it rightly demands of courts especial clarity and
persuasiveness, because of the extraordinary protection a right
once deemed fundamental acquires against legieilative encroachment. Thus Justice Harlan wrote:
Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be consiq.ered against a background of Constitutional purposes, as they have
been rationally perceived and historically developed . . . . The
decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds
which follow closely on well-accepted principles and criteria. The
new decision must take "its place in relation to what went before
and further [cut] a channel for what is to come.'.'68

And thus it is incredible that without a hint of explanation the
court in People v. Belous announced "[t]he fundamental right
65.
66.
67.
68.
ted).

410
410
410
Poe

U.S. at 152 (citation omitted).
U.S. at 155.
U.S. at 173.
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omit-
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of the woman to choose whether to bear children. " 69 If the court
had convincingly shown that a right of abortion follows from the
Supreme Court's privacy cases, it would have taken the first step
toward showing that right fundamental. It was content instead to
apply the label, and the courts that followed it were content to
march in lockstep behind. Babbitz v. McCann, for example, credited Belous with showing that a right of abortion "is a fundamental liberty that is implicit in the penumbrae of the Bill of Rights,
and is supported, by analogy, in many past decisions." 70 Then the
lower-court Roe v. Wade relied on Belous and Babbitz, 11 and Doe
v. Scott relied on all three, 72 plus the lower-court United States
v. Vuitch, which never said a word about fundamental rights. 73
The misuse of the fundamental rights concept became unmistakable in the lower-court Roe, which said, "Freedom to choose in
the matter of abortions has been accorded the status of a
'fundamental' right in every case coming to the attention of this
Court . . . ." 74 Merely counting judicial votes for bestowing
super-protection is exactly what courts are not supposed to do.
But that is what the lower courts and the Supreme Court did.
C.

"The appellee . . . argue[s] that the fetus is a
'person' . . . . "

To respond to Texas's argument that "the fetus is a 'person'
within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, "75 the Supreme Court listed each use of "person" in the
Constitution, adroitly adduced that "in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally, "76 and concluded, "All this, together with our observation . . . that throughout the major portion of the 19th century
prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are
today, persuades us that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unbom." 77 Professor
69. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1969) (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
70. 310 F. Supp. 293, 300 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970),
71. 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1222 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd. in part and reud. in part, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
72. 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1971), uacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950
(1973).
73. 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969), reud., 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
74. 314 F. Supp. at 1222.
75. 410 U.S. at 156.
76. 410 U.S. at 157.
77. 410 U.S. at 158.
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Ely, evidently touched by the irony of the Court's sudden allegiance to the letter of the Constitution, found "[t]he canons of
construction employed here . . . most intriguing when they are
contrasted with those invoked to derive the -constitutional right
to an abortion." 78
The irony appeared in pre-Roe case law as well. Although
most of the lower courts, including those that upheld abortion
statutes, never addressed this issue, two courts faced it squarely
when purported guardians ad litem alleged that abortions unconstitutionally deprive fetuses of life. In both McGarvey v. MageeWomens Hospital, where the guardian claimed that even Pennsylvania's traditional restrictive statute was unconstitutional for
allowing abortions without "some form of judicial process," 79 and
Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., where the
guardian argued that New York's liberal statute was unconstitutional for ever allowing abortions except to save the woman's
life, 80 the courts found that the fourteenth amendment does not
include fetuses, and they therefore emphatically disclaimed any
authority to disturb the legislative balances. 81 Both courts are to
be praised for their restraint, but it is ironic that in the midst of
judicial legislation to expand abortion, the two courts asked to
restrict it invoked judicial restraint. That is especially ironic
because had the courts wished to expand fetal protection, they
could arguably have relied, given the generally low level of analysis in the pre-Roe cases, on the earlier anti-abortion decision in
Steinberg v. Brown. 82 Casually relying on the defendant's biology
and Webster's dictionary, the court in Steinberg had decided
that life begins at conception and that " [o]nee human life has
commenced, the constitutional protections found in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments impose upon the state the duty of
safeguarding it." 83 Of course, Steinberg's effort to draw fetuses
within the fourteenth amendment by deciding from scanty evidence when life begins had itself been judicial legislation (although paradoxically it supported the balance it second-guessed).
As a whole, the pre-Roe courts, like the Supreme Court, seem to
78. Ely, supra note 2, at 926.
79. 340 F. Supp. 751, 752 (W.D. Pa. 1972), affd., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
80. 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410
U.S. 949 (1973).
81. McGarvey: 340 F. Supp. at 754; Byrn: 31 N.Y.2d at 203,286 N.E.2d at 890,335
N.Y.S.2d at 395.
82. 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
83. 321 F. Supp. at 746-47.
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have found second-guessing a handy resort when needed, but not
the kind of girl one wants to marry.
To bolster its decision that a fetus is not a "person," the
Supreme Court said, "Indeed, our decision in United States v.
Vuitch . . . inferentially is to the same effect, for we there would
not have indulged in statutory interpretation favorable to abortion in specified circumstances if the necessary consequence was
the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection. "84 That statement is a bit disingenuous, for the Court in
Vuitch expressly - which is more than "inferentially" - declined to discuss any aspect of the privacy arguments made by
the appellee. 85 That notwithstanding, the Court can surely apply
interpretative glosses to its own opinions, and this gloss had the
advantage of being ready-made. In strikingly similar language,
Abele v. Markle had previously said, "Surely the Court would
have withheld even tacit approval of abortions in such circumstances if the consequence was the termination of a life entitled
to fourteenth amendment protection." 86 In this instance, then,
the traditional axiom was at work: the lower court identified and
articulated an argument that aided Supreme Court review. Unfortunately, Abele's gloss on Vuitch was a rather minor point; but
still more unfortunately, the Court· settled for plucking it out of
a much larger argument. Abele held that "person" does not include a fetus and specifically referred to Vuitch in the course of
arguing that a state cannot almost totally abridge women's constitutional rights by asserting an interest in fetuses which have
no constitutional rights. 87 That theory is debatable, and even
Abele stated it tentatively, 88 but it was one step toward a more
84. 410 U.S. at 159.
85. Interestingly, the Supreme Court not only avoided discussing the arguments, it
conspicuously avoided even using the word "privacy":
Appellee has suggested that there are other reasons why the dismissal of the indictments should be affirmed. Essentially, these arguments are based on this Court's
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut . . . . Although there was some reference to
these arguments in the opinion of the court below, we read it as holding simply that
the statute was void for vagueness . . .. Since that question of vagueness was the
only issue passed upon by the District Court it is the only issue we reach here.
402 U.S. 62, 72-73 (1971) (citation omitted). Neither the district court nor the appellee,
however, had been reluctant to invoke the right of privacy. See United States v. Vuitch,
305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969), revd., 402 U.S. 62 (1971); Brief for Milan M.
Vuitch, M.D., at 40-44, United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
86. 351 F. Supp. 224, 228 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951
(1973).
87. 351 F. Supp. at 228-30.
88. 351 F. Supp. at 230.
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precise definition of the state interest necessary to abridge constitutional rights than the conclusory tags "rational" and
"compelling." By deciding Roe too soon, the Supreme Court afforded itself only the minor point, precluded any judicial debate
of Abele's theory, and pinned itself to an obfuscating method with
"'compelling' points." 89

D.

"We need not resolve the difficult question of when life
begins . . . . "

Having decided that the Constitution does not protect fetuses, the Supreme Couh turned to Texas's statutory claim:
"Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life
begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and
that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in protecting
that life from and after conception. " 90 In response, the Court
quickly abjured any attempt to decide when life begins, 91 noting
instead that this question yields a "wide divergence of thinking,"92 and that "[i]n areas other than criminal abortion, the law
has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize
it, begins before live birth." 93 How those observations lead to the
conclusion that states may protect fetuses only after viability is
a mystery. The critics have particularly dismissed this portion of
Roe as the merest dissemblance of a rationale. 94 And the Court's
dissembling at this point undercut the purported purpose of its
opinion: to discern the relative weights of the interests involved. 95
By busying itself with the question of what a fetus is - "life,"
"potential life," a "person," a person "in the whole sense" - the
Court avoided admitting that something hangs in the balance
against women's rights and thus avoided the real question of
whether states may protect fetuses, as nothing more than fetuses,
and at what cost to women. 96
This avoidance was the legacy of the pre-Roe cases. The
courts that struck down abortion statutes for abridging women's
right of privacy essentially denied that a fetus is anything at all.
89. 410 U.S. at 163.
90. 410 U.S. at 159.
91. 410 U.S. at 159.
92. 410 U.S. at 160.
93. 410 U.S. at 161.
94. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 2, at 924-26; Epstein, supra note 3, at 180-85; Tribe,
supra note 5, at 3-5.
95. 410 U.S. at 162, 165.
96. See Ely, supra note 2,- at 933.
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As Professor Ely said, "a fetus may not be a 'person in the whole
sense,' but it is certainly not nothing." 97 The lower courts pretended otherwise. In People v. Belous, the court said:
It is next urged that the state has a compelling interest in the
protection of the embryo and fetus and that such interest warrants
the limitation on the woman's constitutional rights. Reliance is
placed upon several statutes and court rules which assertedly show
that the embryo or fetus is equivalent to a born child. However,
all of the statutes and rules relied upon require a live birth or
reflect the interest of the parents.
In any event, there are major and decisive areas where the
embryo and fetus are not treated as equivalent to the born child. 08

Satisfied that a fetus is not equivalent to a born child, the Belous
court thought its task complete. But why must a fetus be
"equivalent to a born child" before the state may protect it? A
fetus is a fetus. The court never considered the straightforward
question "Can the state protect a fetus?" without regard to
whether a fetus is like something else the state protects elsewhere. 99 And because it failed to do so, the court never honestly
faced the question abortion raises.
The other courts were no more honest. The lower court in Roe
v. Wade said, "To be sure, the defendant has presented the Court
with several compelling justifications for state presence in the
area of abortions . . . . Concern over abortion of the 'quickened'
fetus may well rank as . . . such [an] interest." 100 The court did
not say, however, what distinguishes a quickened from an unquickened fetus that the state may protect one but not the other.
If the court thought an unquickened fetus is nothing, then it was
blinking at facts. If the court thought the fetus is something, but
is too insubstantial to count, then it needed to explain why. In
Doe v. Scott 101 and Abele v. Markle, 102 the courts insinuated that
all of what hangs in the balance is something grotesque, by lamenting fetuses that would be born gravely defective or that resulted from rape. Those situations are undeniably tragic, but
97. Ely, supra note 2, at 931.
98. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 967-68, 458 P.2d 194, 202-03, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362-63 (1969)
(footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
99. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 175.
100. 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1223 (N.D. Tex. 1970), afld. in part and revd. in part, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
101. 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1391 (N.D. Ill. 1971), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950
(1973).
102. 342 F. Supp. 800, 804 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951
(1973).
,
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invoking them does not honestly characterize all fetuses. Yet the
Scott and Abele courts, rapt in their discomfort, allowed themselves to avoid admitting that anything not grotesque was at
stake. In Doe v. Bolton, the court acknowledged that "[o]nce
conception takes place and an embryo forms, for better or for
worse the woman carries a life form with the potential of independent human existence." 103 That potentiality, the court said,
grants to the state "a legitimate area of control," 104 so long as the
controls "do not restrict the reasons for the initial decisions" to
abort. 105 That assessment of the fetus differs only superficially
from Belous's or the lower-court Roe's. By leaving unexplained
the limit on the state's interest, the court denied that anything
counterbalances the woman's right just as effectively as Belous
and Roe did when they diverted themselves with questions about
what a fetus is or resembles. One court, Babbitz v. McCann, at
least tried to be honest: "For the purposes of this decision, we
think it is sufficient to conclude that the mother's interests are
superior to that of an unquickened embryo, whether the embryo
is mere protoplasm, as the plaintiff contends, or a human being,
as the Wisconsin statute declares." 108 Why the woman's interests
prevail, however, is unexplained.
In sum, the resort to questions like "Is a fetus a person?" "To
what extent do other statutes protect fetuses?" and "Is a fetus
alive?" did more to divert the courts from their analytic duties
than to answer the question before them. One of the last pre-Roe
cases, Abele v. Markle, realized that fact, and dismissed in a
footnote the comparisons to other statutes. 107 Perhaps if the Supreme Court had allowed the abortion dispute to brew longer,
more courts would have faced the question and offered guidance
when the Court finally decided a case. That it rushed into this
darkness to decide Roe, only to fail to add new illumination,
simply adds to the impression that the Court should have heeded
the traditional axioms.
The Court concluded its discussion of Texas's statutory
claim by remarking, "In short, the unborn have never been recog103. 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (emphasis original), modified and affd.,
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
104. 319 F. Supp. at 1055.
105. 319 F. Supp. at 1056.
106. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per
curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970).
107. Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 226 n.5 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973).
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nized in the law as persons in the whole sense." 108 This regrettable
sentence first appeared in Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. 109 After noting that fetuses may acquire some rights
even before birth, the Byrn court said, "But unborn children have
never been recognized as persons in the law in the whole sense." 110
In context, the import of this sentence is quite clear. The Byrn
court meant that even if fetuses receive some protection, they
have never received all the protection people receive after birth.
The Supreme Court, by using the sentence to end the entire section on Texas's interests, and by prefixing to it "In short," which
clearly signals that a summary definitive statement should follow, managed to obscure what little meaning the sentence has.
The traditional axiom recommends that the Court use lowercourt arguments to its benefit; in this instance the Court adopted
the argument so cryptically that it lost any potential benefits.

E.

''[W}e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of
li·r.1 e . . . . ,,

Having decided in section IX that a fetus is neither a fourteenth amendment "person," nor a "person in the whole sense,"
the Supreme Court opened section X with, "In view of all this,
we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may
override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake." 111
This is a curious statement. If read out of context, it would seem
to suggest that Roe is a case about the limits of state authority
to regulate activity by deciding metaphysical questions. For according to this statement, the Court did not object to Texas's end
- prohibiting abortions - but to its means - "adopting one
theory of life." But that suggestion seems untenable if the statement is read in context, for nothing preceding it in the opinion
discussed what theories a state may or may not endorse in the
course of regulation, nor did the opinion say anything about
states adopting theories when it subsequently announced its
schema of permissible regulation. What, then, is the phrase, "by
adopting one theory of life" doing there? One fairly plausible
answer is that the phrase was meant to conceal some doctrinal
sleight of hand. The Court surely wanted to avoid explicitly inval108.
109.
U.S. 949
110.
111.

410 U.S. at 162.
31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887,335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410
(1973).
31 N.Y.2d at 200, 286 N.E.2d at 888, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
410 U.S. at 162.
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idating Texas's legislative goal, even if that is what the Court was
doing. Conveniently for the Court, Texas's brief justified protecting fetuses from the moment of conception by arguing that that
is when life begins and that the state has a duty to protect life. 112
Thus, although objecting to the goal, the Court could attack the
means - verbally if not analytically. Obviously, the sleight of
hand was not very deft.
There may be a second, less cynical explanation for the
phrase. By looking to the nature of Texas's interest - one that
adopted a theory of life - the Supreme Court might have been
suggesting a rationale similar to the unique theory developed in
Abele v. Markle. 113 That theory grew from a legislative-judicial
dialogue that- may well have continued had the Supreme Court
not decided Roe. In April 1972, a three-judge district court struck
down Connecticut's restrictive abortion statute, 114 with one of the
two majority judges expressly declining to decide how he would
have voted had the state persuasively shown that an interest in
. protecting fetuses originally motivated the statute's enactment. 115
One month later, the Connecticut General Assembly enacted a
substantially identical statute with a new first section declaring,
"The public policy of the state and the intent of the legislature
is to protect and preserve human life from the moment of conception . . . . " 116 When this new statute was challep.ged, the Abele
court responded by considering "whether the state has power to
advance such a purpose" by abridging a constitutional right. 117 In
the course of its consideration, the court, rather than attaching
or withholding the label "compelling," attempted the difficult
task of articulating the nature of a compelling state interest:
A compelling state interest has generally been one where the nature of the interest was broadly accepted, with dispute remaining
only as to whether the state could constitutionally advance that
interest by the specific means being challenged .
. . . No decision of the Supreme Court has ever permitted
anyone's constitutional right to be directly abridged to protect a
state interest which is subject to such a variety of personal judgments [as is Connecticut's interest in protecting life from concep112.
113.
114.
U.S. 951
115.
116.
117.

Brief for Appellee at 31, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973).
Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410
(1973).
342 F. Supp. at 810 (Newman, J., concurring).
351 F. Supp. at "226.
351 F. Supp. at 227.
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tion on] . . . . Such an interest cannot acquire the force of a
governmental decree to abridge an individual's constitutional
right. To uphold such a statute would permit the state to impose
its view of the nature of a fetus upon those who have the constitutional right to base an important decision in their personal lives
upon a different view.
. . . Of course, legislation is not rendered unconstitutional
simply because it advances a social policy about which people
differ. Normally it is the legislative function to resolve such differences. But where a state interest subject to such variety of viewpoints is asserted on behalf of a fetus which lacks constitutional
rights, and where the assertion of such an interest would accomplish the virtually total abridgment of a constitutional right of
special significance, in these circumstances such a state interest
cannot prevail. 118

Pursuant to this test, the Abele court again struck down Connecticut's statute, but also suggested the type of abortion statute this
test would allow:
If a statute sought to protect the lives of all fetuses which
could survive outside the uterus, such a statute would be a legislative acceptance of the concept of viability . . . . [T]he state interest in protecting the life of a fetus capable of living outside the
uterus could be shown to be more generally accepted and, therefore, of more weight in the constitutional sense than the interest
in preventing the abortion of a fetus that is not viable. 119

The Supreme Court's otherwise inexplicable discussion of
state interests in Roe can be read, with some imagination, to
suggest a similar argument. 120 Texas claimed just what Connecti118. 351 F. Supp. at 230-31 (citations omitted).
119. 351 F. Supp. at 232 (footnote omitted).
120. Of course, the Court cited in Roe all the lower court decisions, 410 U.S. at 16455, but it seems clear that the Court was particularly familiar with Abele, for part "A" of
Roe's § IX contains striking verbal and organizational parallels to Abele's part "A."
Organizationally, both opinions marshalled the same evidence to argue that a fetus is not
a fourteenth amendment "person": that other constitutional uses of "person" do not apply
to fetuses, compare 410 U.S. at 157 with 351 F. Supp. at 229 n.8; that courts which had
addressed the issue had held that fetuses are not "persons," compare 410 U.S. at 168 with
351 F. Supp. at 228; and that United States v. Vuitch had implied that fetuses are not
"persons," compare 410 U.S. at 159 with 351 F. Supp. at 228. No other lower-court opinion
adduces the same three points. Verbally, Roe echoed Abele's language three times: (1)
it described Vuitch's implication with similar words, see text at notes 84-86 supra; (2) its
statement of the first claim it considered - "that the fetus is a 'person' within the
language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment," 410 U.S. at 166 - resembled
Abele's "The initial inquiry is whether the fetus is a person, within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment . . . ," 351 F. Supp. at 228; and (3) its reference to "those few
cases where the issue was squarely presented," 410 U.S. at 158, resembled Abele'a reference to the two courts in which "[t)he issue has been squarely faced." 361 F. Supp. at

August 1979]

Pre-Roe Case Law

1745

cut had: that "life begins at conception and is present throughout
pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception." 121 The Court
said two things in response. First: "It should be sufficient to note
briefly the wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive and
difficult question." 122 Unfortunately, the Court left ambiguous
exactly what the wide divergence of thinking suffices to show.
Perhaps this survey of opinion suffices to show that "the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not
in a position to speculate" about when life begins. 123 The survey
also suffices to show, however; that Texas's state interest rests on
a theory that many people, including no doubt many pregnant
women, sincerely reject. Second: "In areas other than criminal
abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that
life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth . . . ." 124 Professor
Ely is surely right that if the Court was trying to show why Texas
may not protect fetuses before viability, then "the bodies of doctrine to which the Court adverts . . . tend to undercut rather
than support its conclusion." 125 If, on the other hand, the Court
was trying to suggest that a compelling state interest may not
depend on a premise so widely disputed as that life begins at
conception, then revealing that no other doctrines or statutes
endorse that premise does support its conclusion. Finally, like the
Abele court, the Supreme Court designated viability as "the
'compelling' point." 128 It explained: "This is so because the fetus
then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications." 127 While
the Court does not appear to suggest that it selected viability
because Texas's interest would then be "more generally accepted,"128 which is how Abele decided on viability, it does seem
228. Of course the verbal and organizational parallels do not prove much, especially the
verbal ones, for judges borrow language from each other like brothers borrow socks: constantly, if not openly. But they do suggest that the Supreme Court knew more about Abele
than its holding.
121. 410 U.S. at 159; Brief for Appellee, supra note 112.
122. 410 U.S. at 160.
123. 410 U.S. at 159.
124. 410 U.S. at 161.
125. Ely, supra note 2, at 925.
126. 410 U.S. at 163.
.
127. 410 U.S. at 163.
128. Abele v. Markle,"351 F. Supp. 244,232 (D. Conn.1972), vacated and remanded,
410 U.S. 951 (1973).
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to find significant that by viability Texas may justify its interest
in fetal life with more than just one debatable theory chosen from
among many. By the time a fetus is viable, logic and biology
dictate that the fetus, if not alive, is at least almost alive. Therefore, to read a bit into the opinion, Texas's interest would no
longer depend on a widely disputed premise, and by the Abele
test could be "compelling."
This reading of Roe is purely speculative. Indeed, seeing
Abele's theory in Roe is like finding the hidden object drawn into
a puzzle-picture: one must know to look for it. 129 Even if Roe does
contain fine shadings of Abele, the opinion still leaves many questions unanswered. The best that can be said is equivocal: It is
heartening to think that some rationale lurks behind Roe, but
equally disheartening that after taking Roe too soon for that rationale to develop further, the Court would not say whether it
used the rationale or not, and if not, then what rationale it did
use.

F.

"Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches
term . . . . "

Immediately after rejecting Texas's claim to protect fetuses
from the moment of conception, the Court granted that the state
yet had "important and legitimate" interests in protecting
women's health and fetuses' potential life. 130 "Each [interest]
grows in substantiality as the woman approaches terJil and, at a
point during pregnancy, each becomes 'compelling.' " 131 For the
interest in protecting women's health, "the 'compelling' point"
was approximately the end of the first trimester, "because of the
now-established medical fact . . . that until the end of the first
trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in
normal childbirth." 132 Thus, abortions within the first trimester
are "free of interference by the State." 133 For the interest in protecting potential life, "the 'compelling' point" was viability, be129. Once one begins looking, however, one finds in Roe a great many more references
to beliefs, theories, and the divergence of thinking than one might have suspected were
there. The opinion's first page-and-a-half, for instance, mentions attitudes, views, and
thinking six times. 410 U.S. at 116-17. And, of course, the Court included its muchmaligned survey of "medical and medical-legal history" to show "what that history reveals about man's attitudes" toward abortion. 410 U.S. at 117.
130. 410 U.S. at 162.
131. 410 U.S. at 162-63.
132. 410 y.S. at 163.
133. 410 U.S. at 163.
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cause as already mentioned, "the fetus then presumably has the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." 134
The Supreme Court must have been well acquainted with
differentiating compellingness of state interests according to
length of pregnancy, for most of the pre-Roe courts had done it.
With the exception of Abele, however, none of the lower courts
had protected the right to abortion so zealously as did the Supreme Court. In assessing states' interests in women's health, for
example, the lower courts had often relied solely on statistics
about the relative risks in abortion and childbirth to justify their
decisions that those interests no longer warranted prohibiting
abortions in the first trimester .135 But all the lower courts had
expressly conceded that even in the first trimester the state could
regulate who may perform abortions and where. 136 As to interests
in protecting fetuses, the courts had generally found those uncompelling during "early" pregnancy, 137 or before quickening. 138
While the courts had rarely specified when "early" pregnancy
134. 410 U.S. at 163.
135. See, e.g., YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1074 (D.N.J.1972), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 989, affd. without opinion, 493 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1974); Babbitz v. McCann,
310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970); People
v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954,965,458 P.2d 194, 200-01, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360-61 (1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). The statistical studies most frequently cited were by Christopher Tietze. That name became so familiar in the pre-Roe cases and in the Roe briefs,
that when the Supreme Court cited three Tietze studies among the five named sources
that wholly supported the decision not to allow any state regulation during the first
trimester, 410 U.S. at 149 n.44, 163, one begins to think that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment enacts Dr. Christopher Tietze's Abortion Statistics.
136. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800,804 (D. Conn.1972), vacated and remanded,
410 U.S. 951 (1973); YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1075-76 (D.N.J. 1972), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 989, affd. without opinion, 493 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1974); Doe v. Scott,
321 F. Supp. 1385, 1391 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (decision that a state interest in women's health
is uncompelling limited to abortions "by licensed physicians in a licensed hospital"),
vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp.1048, 1056 (N.D.
Ga. 1970), modified and affd., 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1223
(N.D. Tex. 1970), affd. in part and revd. in part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Babbitz v. McCann,
310 F. Supp. 293, 302 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970);
People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 965, 458 P.2d 194, 201, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360-61 (1969)
(decision that state interest in women's health is uncompelling limited to "a hospital
therapeutic abortion"), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
137. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. at 804 ("within an appropriate period after conception"); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. at 1391 ("the early stages"); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F.
Supp. at 1055 (exactly what Bolton held is difficult to discern - indeed, after two months
the court issued an explanatory supplemental opinion - but the plaintiffs alleged a right
to terminate "an unwanted pregnancy in its early stages," and the court apparently
accepted that); United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. at 1035 ("early stages").
138. YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. at 1075; Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. at 1223,
Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. at 299.
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ends, none of them except Abele 139 had indicated in any way that
it stretches to viability.
· More important than the timing of when interests become
compelling, however, is the fact that none of the courts - lower
or Supreme - adequately justified differentiating by length of
pregnancy at all. None of them explained why relative risks
"should provide the only constitutionally relevant measure of
permissible state regulation" 140 to protect the mother's health.
And, as seen before, most of them never honestly faced the task
of balancing states' interests in fetuses against women's interests
in abortion, 141 much less articulated why the state interest was
"compelling" in late pregnancy but not in early. Thus, when the
Supreme Court drafted what Professor Ely called its
"commissioner's regulations." 142 it went beyond any balance of
interests it or the lower court had explained, and beyond what
any lower court (exceptAbele) had thought necessary. To be sure,
the Court was not wholly without models for its selection of viability as "the 'compelling' point": the statutes of Alaska, Hawaii,
and New York allowed abortions for any reason before viability. 143
But the Court could not really have patterned its decision after
them - that would have been judicial legislation.
CONCLUSION

Roe and the pre-Roe cases share many of the same faults,
and not coincidentally. In the face of the lower courts' confusion,
and the inadequacy of most of their attempts to evolve a constitutional analysis for the abortion cases, the Supreme Court was
doubtless tempted to ignore the traditional axioms of Supreme
Court review, to seize the problem and resolve it itself. Roe should
serve as a reminder that quick resolution is not always the wisest
choice, for Roe is an opinion uninformed by any thoughtful lowercourt analysis. The Abele court's attempt to grapple with the
difficult issues suggests that more thoughtful analysis was in the
offing. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not wait to enjoy
those benefits.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

351 F. Supp. at 232.
Tribe, supra note 5, at 4.
See text at note 106 supra.
Ely, supra note 2, at 922.
See Comment, supra note 10, at 181.
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